The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.003MaRDI QIDQ2437168zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takehito Masuda, Yoshitaka Okano, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

approval mechanismmultiple implementationpublic good experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• Toward Natural Implementation

Cited in

(10)

• Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?
• An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
• Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism
• Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
• Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
• Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division
• King Solomon's dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies
• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses

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