The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.003zbMath1284.91153OpenAlexW3122871517MaRDI QIDQ2437168

Yoshitaka Okano, Takehito Masuda, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

approval mechanismmultiple implementationpublic good experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium

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