The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
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Publication:2437168
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.003zbMATH Open1284.91153OpenAlexW3122871517MaRDI QIDQ2437168FDOQ2437168
Authors: Takehito Masuda, Yoshitaka Okano, Tatsuyoshi Saijo 
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
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- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
Cited In (10)
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism
- The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
- Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
- Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?
- An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
- Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions
- Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division
- King Solomon's dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies
- Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
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