Approximation and parameterized complexity of minimax approval voting
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11253zbMATH Open1451.68130arXiv1607.07906OpenAlexW2903252999WikidataQ128873806 ScholiaQ128873806MaRDI QIDQ4558792FDOQ4558792
Authors: Marek Cygan, Łukasz Kowalik, Arkadiusz Socała, Krzysztof Sornat
Publication date: 30 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07906
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- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
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- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
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- Chamberlin-Courant rule with approval ballots: approximating the MaxCover problem with bounded frequencies in FPT time
- PTAS for minimax approval voting
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