Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
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Publication:5111106
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_9zbMATH Open1443.91097OpenAlexW2947224417MaRDI QIDQ5111106FDOQ5111106
Authors: Tatsuyoshi Saijo 
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2019-6.pdf
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism
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