Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_9zbMATH Open1443.91097OpenAlexW2947224417MaRDI QIDQ5111106FDOQ5111106

Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2019-6.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmechanism designsocial dilemmasubgame perfectionsecond thoughts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism

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