Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_9MaRDI QIDQ5111106zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2019-6.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmechanism designsocial dilemmasubgame perfectionsecond thoughts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

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