The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3493681 (Why is no real title available?)
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Conditional cooperation: review and refinement
- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Cited in
(7)- Pledge-and-review in the laboratory
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions
- Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952971 (Why is no real title available?)
- An application of the English clock market mechanism to public goods games
- Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism
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