The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
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Publication:2155253
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105488zbMATH Open1497.91118OpenAlexW4293254105MaRDI QIDQ2155253FDOQ2155253
Authors: Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Reischmann, Andis Sofianos 
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105488
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Cites Work
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- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Conditional cooperation: review and refinement
Cited In (3)
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