Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
- Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- How robust is laboratory gift exchange?
- Incentives in Teams
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Method in experiment: rhetoric and reality
Cited in
(27)- Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Risk-averse and self-interested shifts in groups in both median and random rules
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Monotone strategyproofness
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- On the implementation of the median
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Secure implementation in production economies
- Ex post implementation
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