Spite and reciprocity in auctions

DOI10.3390/G2030365MaRDI QIDQ2344987zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. Nishimura, Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Yoshikazu Ikeda

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030365

zbMATH Keywords

ascending-bid auctiondominant strategyEnglish auctionexperimentreciprocitysecond price auctionsocial preferencesspite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model
• Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games
• Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
• Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
• Comparative statics of altruism and spite
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
• Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A theory of reciprocity
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(15)

• Acts of helping and harming
• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Second-price auction tournament
• Why do you hate me?: On the survival of spite.
• Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
• Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
• Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• Bayesian auctions with friends and foes
• An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions
• The `spite' dilemma: spite or no spite, is there a dilemma?
• A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions

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