Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model

DOI10.1145/2840728.2840741zbMATH Open1334.91039OpenAlexW2296662825MaRDI QIDQ2800566FDOQ2800566

Authors: Jing Chen, Silvio Micali 

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840741

Recommendations

• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
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• Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

zbMATH Keywords

externalityrevenuespitefulnessundominated strategylight Bayesian settingsingle-good auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (4)

• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Game-theoretic models of moral and other-regarding agents (extended abstract)
• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• Bayesian auctions with friends and foes

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