Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model

DOI10.1145/2840728.2840741MaRDI QIDQ2800566zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jing Chen, Silvio Micali

Publication date 15 April 2016

Published in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840741

zbMATH Keywords

externalityrevenuespitefulnessundominated strategylight Bayesian settingsingle-good auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
• Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

Cited in

(4)

• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Game-theoretic models of moral and other-regarding agents (extended abstract)
• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• Bayesian auctions with friends and foes

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