The spite motive in third price auctions
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Publication:1786773
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.028zbMATH Open1396.91270OpenAlexW2759015997MaRDI QIDQ1786773FDOQ1786773
Authors: Wladislaw Mill 
Publication date: 25 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028
Recommendations
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
- Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
- Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games
- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795167
- The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
Cites Work
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- \(k\)-price auctions
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
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