Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:974209
Recommendations
Cites work
Cited in
(7)- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- Fear of losing in a clock auction
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- The spite motive in third price auctions
- Auctions in which losers set the price
This page was built for publication: Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q974209)