Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.01.029MaRDI QIDQ974209zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay

Publication date 27 May 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.029

zbMATH Keywords

overbiddingregretthird price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Does regret matter in first-price auctions?

Cites work

• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Star-shaped probability weighting functions and overbidding in first-price auctions
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Fear of losing in a clock auction
• A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions
• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Auctions in which losers set the price
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions
• Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation

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