Recommendations
- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
Cites work
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
- Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
Cited in
(7)- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
- Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
- Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
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