Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
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Publication:498773
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.004zbMath1321.91021OpenAlexW1965730783MaRDI QIDQ498773
Publication date: 29 September 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.004
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (4)
Does regret matter in first-price auctions? ⋮ Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
Cites Work
- Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
- Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
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