Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
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Publication:523002
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.05.001zbMATH Open1393.91087OpenAlexW2401057487MaRDI QIDQ523002FDOQ523002
Authors: Ian Krajbich, Antonio Rangel, Colin Camerer 
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/76635/
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)
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