Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.05.001MaRDI QIDQ523002zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ian Krajbich, Antonio Rangel, Colin Camerer

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/76635/

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsdecision makingexperimentsmechanism designneuroeconomicspublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Neuroscience experiment applied to investigate decision-maker behavior in the tradeoff elicitation procedure
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2226165
• A model of boundedly rational ``neuro~agents

Cites work

• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• School choice: an experimental study
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
• The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cited in

(2)

• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Exploring cognitive aspects of FITradeoff method using neuroscience tools

This page was built for publication: Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q523002)