Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.08.008MaRDI QIDQ2667258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jana Rollmann, Clemens Puppe

Publication date 24 November 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

budget allocationmean rulenormalized median rulevoting behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Voting theory (91B12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• One man, one bid
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions
• An experimental study of storable votes

Cites work

• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting

Cited in

(7)

• The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving
• Budget processes: theory and experimental evidence
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• Participation in voting over budget allocations: a field experiment
• Information design for weighted voting
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals with proportionality guarantees
• An experimental study of storable votes

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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