Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.009zbMath1255.91191OpenAlexW3122728893MaRDI QIDQ1934842

Takuma Wakayama, Yuji Fujinaka

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13257

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessNash implementationdominant strategy implementationsecure implementationindivisible objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Secure implementation in production economies ⋮ An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems

Cites Work

• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Manipulation through bribes
• Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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