Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015zbMath1296.91096OpenAlexW2011384232MaRDI QIDQ2016223

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

robust implementationsecure implementationprivate valuesfull implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation

Cites Work

• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Robust Mechanism Design

This page was built for publication: Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems