Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
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Publication:5931922
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0800zbMath1013.91006OpenAlexW2042675238WikidataQ59938150 ScholiaQ59938150MaRDI QIDQ5931922
Simon P. Anderson, Charles A. Holt, Jacob K. Goeree
Publication date: 6 May 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0800
logit equilibriumlogit probabilistic choice functionminimum-effort coordination gamePareto-ranked Nash equilibriastochastic potentialstochastic potential function
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