Money illusion and coordination failure

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.04.005zbMATH Open1168.91307OpenAlexW3121695194MaRDI QIDQ876882FDOQ876882

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publication date: 19 April 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

coordination failuremultiple equilibriacoordination gamesequilibrium selectionmoney illusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

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• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• Loss aversion and seller behavior: Evidence from the housing market
• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs

Cited In (5)

• Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
• Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
• The New Keynesian Phillips curve with myopic agents
• Dynamic choice, independence and emotions
• Smart or stupid depends on who is your counterpart: a cobweb model with heterogeneous expectations

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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