Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.10.018MaRDI QIDQ631263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tore Ellingsen, Robert Östling

Publication date 22 March 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.018

zbMATH Keywords

coordination failurecoordination gamesstrategic riskweak-link games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Admissibility and common belief.
• An experimental study of costly coordination
• Game theory
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• The two-person beauty contest

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