Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:324180)
Recommendations
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
Cites work
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3152611 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers
- Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
- Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game
- Strategy and equity: An ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game
- The gambler's and hot-hand fallacies: theory and applications
- The perception of randomness
- The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Veto power in committees: An experimental study
- Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in probability
Cited in
(5)- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
- A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences
- Legislative bargaining with teams
This page was built for publication: Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q324180)