Legislative bargaining with teams
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Publication:495664
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.001zbMATH Open1347.91152OpenAlexW3123739810MaRDI QIDQ495664FDOQ495664
Authors: Anthony J. Bradfield, John H. Kagel 
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
- Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
Cited In (10)
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Demand bargaining in legislatures
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