Recommendations
Cites work
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
- Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
Cited in
(10)- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Demand bargaining in legislatures
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