Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
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Publication:2059072
DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01298-6zbMATH Open1479.91297OpenAlexW3048602272MaRDI QIDQ2059072FDOQ2059072
Authors: Valerio Dotti
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01298-6
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