Reaching across the aisle to block reforms

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01298-6zbMATH Open1479.91297OpenAlexW3048602272MaRDI QIDQ2059072FDOQ2059072

Authors: Valerio Dotti 

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01298-6

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

multidimensional policy spacelegislative coalitionsreforms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

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• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
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• A model of political parties
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
• A spatial theory of party formation
• Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection

Cited In (2)

• Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly
• Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining

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