Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
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Publication:1599827
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2688zbMath1012.91004OpenAlexW2032493405MaRDI QIDQ1599827
Boaz Moselle, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 6 June 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80317/
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