Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
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Publication:2452138
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0587-5zbMATH Open1287.91128OpenAlexW2163252580MaRDI QIDQ2452138FDOQ2452138
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2009-3.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Gamson's law and hedonic games
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- A crash course in implementation theory
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- A market to implement the core
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Government formation in a two dimensional policy space
- An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions
Cited In (3)
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