Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0587-5zbMath1287.91128OpenAlexW2163252580MaRDI QIDQ2452138

M. Socorro Puy

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2009-3.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• The scholarship assignment problem
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• A market to implement the core
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Gamson's law and hedonic games
• An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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