Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A market to implement the core
- An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
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- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- Gamson's law and hedonic games
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Government formation in a two dimensional policy space
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
- The scholarship assignment problem
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
Cited in
(7)- Solidarity to achieve stability
- Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
- Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
- Government formation in a two dimensional policy space
- Dynamic analysis of stability of coalition governments in Japan 1993
- An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060932 (Why is no real title available?)
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