Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
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Publication:2452138
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0587-5zbMath1287.91128MaRDI QIDQ2452138
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2009-3.pdf
91F10: History, political science
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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