Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2091703
DOI10.3390/g13040048zbMath1501.91148OpenAlexW3142968435MaRDI QIDQ2091703
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Mandar P. Oak
Publication date: 2 November 2022
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13040048
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