Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
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Publication:1590051
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2682zbMath0971.91053OpenAlexW1986022719WikidataQ60501414 ScholiaQ60501414MaRDI QIDQ1590051
Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo
Publication date: 26 October 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7453/files/bu980001.pdf
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