Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
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Cites work
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- Large Poisson games
- Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
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