Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
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Publication:337788
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.08.004zbMATH Open1371.91051OpenAlexW2155090943MaRDI QIDQ337788FDOQ337788
Authors: Niall Hughes
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/82165/2/WRAP_ec-131016-hughes_jet.pdf
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Cites Work
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Large Poisson games
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- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
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- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
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