The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
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Publication:2397632
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.003zbMATH Open1400.91157OpenAlexW2590775388MaRDI QIDQ2397632FDOQ2397632
Carlos Pimienta, Claudia Meroni
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dse.univr.it/home/workingpapers/wp2015n25.pdf
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Cited In (5)
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