Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00213zbMATH Open1020.91008OpenAlexW2027764257MaRDI QIDQ4531019FDOQ4531019

Authors: Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson 

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00213

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrianormal-form gameregular valuegeneric game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity, stability, well-posedness (49K40) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cited In (12)

• Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies
• Network formation and pairwise stability: a new oddness theorem
• Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: the case of polynomial payoff functions
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
• Structure theorems for game trees
• Essential equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms
• Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games

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