Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games
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Cites work
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Cited in
(7)- A note on generalized Nash games played on networks
- Network formation and pairwise stability: a new oddness theorem
- The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
- Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: the case of polynomial payoff functions
- (Non-)existence and scope of Nash networks
- Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes
- Costly network formation and regular equilibria
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