Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation
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Publication:532650
DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0140-7zbMATH Open1211.91080OpenAlexW3125241557MaRDI QIDQ532650FDOQ532650
Authors: Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Rahmi İlkılıç 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7
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- Strategic network formation through an intermediary
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- Network formation under negative degree-based externalities
- Balancing Load via Small Coalitions in Selfish Ring Routing Games
- Shadow links
- Social interactions and spillovers
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- Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent
- SPACETIME DISCOUNTED VALUE OF NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
- Efficient partnership formation in networks
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- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Group representation concerns and network formation
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- The algorithm and model of pairwise stable networks
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- On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation
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- The computation of pairwise stable networks
- Evolution of social networks
- Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
- Towards a solution concept for network formation games
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