Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7zbMath1211.91080MaRDI QIDQ532650

Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Rahmi İlkılıç

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7

zbMATH Keywords

network formation; proper equilibrium; pairwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

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