Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.004zbMath1165.91338MaRDI QIDQ2389314

Carlos González Pimienta

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

networks; Nash equilibrium; generic finiteness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes, Costly network formation and regular equilibria

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