Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0114-xzbMath1241.91025MaRDI QIDQ427551

Berno Buechel, Tim Hellmann

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/305716/files/externalitiesred12publishedversion.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stability; efficiency; spillovers; networks; connections; externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation, Competition for the access to and use of information in networks, On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks, Evolution of social networks

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