Network potentials

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0026-3zbMath1274.91358MaRDI QIDQ2462898

Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0026-3

zbMATH Keywords

network formation; potential functions; pairwise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

91A43: Games involving graphs

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