Universality of Nash components
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Publication:2016220
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.010zbMATH Open1294.91038OpenAlexW2061523847WikidataQ57935147 ScholiaQ57935147MaRDI QIDQ2016220FDOQ2016220
Authors: Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP1205.pdf
Recommendations
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special polytopes (linear programming, centrally symmetric, etc.) (52B12) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)
Cites Work
- The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria
- On equilibria in finite games
- Universality of Nash Equilibria
- From evolutionary to strategic stability.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
- On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
- Symmetry and \(p\)-stability
Cited In (6)
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