Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0400-XMaRDI QIDQ2268369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 5 March 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0400-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
• Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior

Cites work

• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3781003 (Why is no real title available?)
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Cited in

(1)

• Equality in legislative bargaining

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