Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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Publication:1824523
DOI10.1007/BF01832918zbMath0682.90006OpenAlexW2064795175MaRDI QIDQ1824523
Bezalel Peleg, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01832918
Related Items (42)
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Cites Work
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- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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