Tops-only domains
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Publication:623445
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0509-2zbMath1222.91015OpenAlexW2121445935MaRDI QIDQ623445
Arunava Sen, Shurojit Chatterji
Publication date: 14 February 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1890
Related Items (31)
Dictatorship on top-circular domains ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Strategy-proof partitioning ⋮ Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices ⋮ Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Further results on dictatorial domains ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains ⋮ Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population ⋮ Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? ⋮ Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization ⋮ Circular domains ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Cites Work
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