On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
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Publication:2212751
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.08.005zbMATH Open1452.91130OpenAlexW2943402493MaRDI QIDQ2212751FDOQ2212751
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2019/96519.pdf
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- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
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