Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
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Publication:2138383
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102656zbMath1490.91093arXiv2105.10677OpenAlexW4212991745MaRDI QIDQ2138383
Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng, Arunava Sen, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10677
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