Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

DOI10.3982/TE4177MaRDI QIDQ3390540zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, Huaxia Zeng

Publication date 24 March 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4177

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingmechanism designlocal incentive constraintsstategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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(7)

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• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles

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