Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

DOI10.3982/TE4177zbMATH Open1485.91082OpenAlexW3211216912MaRDI QIDQ3390540FDOQ3390540

Authors: Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, Huaxia Zeng 

Publication date: 24 March 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4177

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zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingmechanism designlocal incentive constraintsstategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (7)

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• The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
• Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
• Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles

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