On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
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Publication:1097181
DOI10.1007/BF00286869zbMATH Open0634.90100OpenAlexW1986315851MaRDI QIDQ1097181FDOQ1097181
Authors: Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles 
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00286869
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Cites Work
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- Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria
- Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
- Saturation Locale et Concepts Primitifs de la Theorie du Consommateur
- Functions with a Proper Local Maximum in Each Interval
- Continuous Functions with a Dense Set of Proper Local Maxima
Cited In (7)
- On the core of voting games
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
- The core of voting games: a partition approach
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
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