On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00286869MaRDI QIDQ1097181zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles

Publication date 1987

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00286869

zbMATH Keywords

choice of the topologylocal corevoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• On the core of voting games
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Cites work

• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Continuous Functions with a Dense Set of Proper Local Maxima
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Functions with a Proper Local Maximum in Each Interval
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• On the Continuous Representation of Preorders
• Regular, Nonconvex Economies
• Saturation Locale et Concepts Primitifs de la Theorie du Consommateur
• Smooth Preferences
• Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria
• Structural instability of the core

Cited in

(7)

• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• On the core of voting games
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
• Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
• The core of voting games: a partition approach
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

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