On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
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Cites work
- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- Continuous Functions with a Dense Set of Proper Local Maxima
- Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
- Functions with a Proper Local Maximum in Each Interval
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- On the Continuous Representation of Preorders
- Regular, Nonconvex Economies
- Saturation Locale et Concepts Primitifs de la Theorie du Consommateur
- Smooth Preferences
- Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria
- Structural instability of the core
Cited in
(7)- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- On the core of voting games
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
- The core of voting games: a partition approach
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
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