The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.001MaRDI QIDQ2435899zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

costly votingelectoral competitionequivalenceprobabilistic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• A law of large numbers for large economies
• A theory of voting in large elections
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables

Cited in

(2)

• A college admissions clearinghouse
• Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

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