Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
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Publication:6100490
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845zbMath1519.91091OpenAlexW4365143777MaRDI QIDQ6100490
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó, Pablo Neme
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845
Cites Work
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