Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102845MaRDI QIDQ6100490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó, Pablo Neme

Publication date 22 June 2023

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessanonymityunanimitysingle-peakednesstops-onlyness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
• A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
• A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
• Corrigendum to: ``On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
• On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(6)

• A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
• Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
• On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

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