Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
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Publication:6100490
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102845zbMATH Open1519.91091OpenAlexW4365143777MaRDI QIDQ6100490FDOQ6100490
Authors: Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó, Pablo Neme 
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845
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Cites Work
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Cited In (6)
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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