Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
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Publication:705955
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002zbMath1085.91036OpenAlexW2000054554MaRDI QIDQ705955
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002
Related Items (5)
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies ⋮ Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions
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- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
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- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Basic Geometry of Voting
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