Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.003zbMath1296.91099OpenAlexW2013384011MaRDI QIDQ2016215

Wonki Jo Cho

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1314.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityexchange economy\(\delta\)-efficiency\(\delta\)-strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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