Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.003zbMATH Open1296.91099OpenAlexW2013384011MaRDI QIDQ2016215FDOQ2016215

Authors: Wonki Jo Cho 

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1314.pdf

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
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• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityexchange economy\(\delta\)-efficiency\(\delta\)-strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A note on Gale's example
• Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

Cited In (6)

• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
• Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences

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