Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:647541
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0479-0zbMATH Open1235.91062OpenAlexW2044854382MaRDI QIDQ647541FDOQ647541
Authors: Alexander Reffgen 
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0479-0
Recommendations
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
- A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Voting by Committees
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Kelly's conjecture
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Dictatorial domains
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
Cited In (9)
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- A Savage-Like Representation Theorem for Preferences on Multi-acts
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Manipulability of consular election rules
This page was built for publication: Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q647541)
