Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01248-0MaRDI QIDQ2217367zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takeshi Momi

Publication date 29 December 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01248-0

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functionmany-agent economiesPareto-efficient allocation mechanismpartially identical preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
• Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
• Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies

Cited in

(20)

• Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784400 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
• Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
• Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
• Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
• Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
• Acceptable and Walrasian allocations
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies

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