Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01248-0zbMATH Open1471.91210OpenAlexW3009246716MaRDI QIDQ2217367FDOQ2217367
Authors: Takeshi Momi 
Publication date: 29 December 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01248-0
Recommendations
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
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- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
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- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
social choice functionmany-agent economiesPareto-efficient allocation mechanismpartially identical preferences
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
- Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
Cited In (20)
- Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- Non-dictatorial public distribution rules
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- Acceptable and Walrasian allocations
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
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