Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies (Q2217367)

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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
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    Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies (English)
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    29 December 2020
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    This paper considers the Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism in many-agent exchange economies. It is known that in two-agent exchange economies any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is dictatorial. The article begins with an overview of the relevant literature on Pareto efficiency and allocation mechanisms before continuing with the description of the proposed model and results. The third section introduces the notion of partially identical preferences which are necessary for the proof of the main theorem in the following sections, namely that in many-agent exchange economies any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is alternately dictatorial.
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    Pareto-efficient allocation mechanism
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    many-agent economies
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    social choice function
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    partially identical preferences
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