Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46153 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
Cited in
(6)- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
- Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result
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