Bargaining with learning
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Publication:2425144
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.02.002zbMATH Open1417.91238OpenAlexW3124610736MaRDI QIDQ2425144FDOQ2425144
Authors: Tanjim Hossain
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.02.002
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A unique costly contemplation representation
- "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Cited In (6)
- Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
- Bargaining with reasonable aspirations
- Negotiating using rewards
- Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information
- A generalized learning curve adapted for purchasing and cost reduction negotiations
- Bargaining with endogenous information
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